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REPLY

Medical Civil Rights as a Site of Activism: A
Reply to Critics
Craig Konnoth*
My respondents, Allison Hoffman, and Rabia Belt and Doron Dorfman,
generously wrote their responses to my Article, Medicalization and the New
Civil Rights as the nation lurched from crisis to crisis.1 Their responses were
written in the throes of the onslaught of COVID-19, the effects of which were
concentrated on those who were already vulnerable. With the epidemic still
raging, protests broke out over the killing of George Floyd. We live in a time
when the law seems to have failed those seeking justice—and we are casting
about for alternatives.2
Enter medical civil rights. In the context of the Floyd murder itself,
Minneapolis City Council Vice President Andrea Jenkins, the first openly
transgender Black woman elected to public office in the United States, argued
that racism should be declared a public health emergency.3 Analogizing racism
to “cancer,” she argued, “[u]ntil we name this virus [i.e. racism], we will never,
ever resolve this issue.”4 The Cleveland City Council’s Health and Human
Services committee met virtually (in light of the COVID-19 epidemic) to
discuss a resolution declaring “Racism as a Public Health Crisis.”5 The President
of the American Psychological Association similarly argued, “[w]e are living in
a racism pandemic, which is taking a heavy psychological toll on our African

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. My thanks to Aziza
Ahmed, Jessica Clarke, Ruth Colker, Allison Hoffman, and Michael Stein for comments,
on extremely short notice.
1. Rabia Belt & Doron Dorfman, Response, Reweighing Medical Civil Rights, 72 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 176 (2020); Allison K. Hoffman, Response, How Medicalization of Civil
Rights Could Disappoint, 72 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 165 (2020).
2. Cf. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.
J. 2054 (2017) (describing legal estrangement in police contexts).
3. Minneapolis City Council Official Calls for Racism to be Declared a Public Health Emergency,
AXIOS (May 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/7N3K-7ULM.
4. Id.
5. Racism as a Public Health Crisis Virtual Meeting, CLEVELAND CITY COUNCIL (May 30,
2020), https://perma.cc/2THA-RM9W.
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American citizens.”6 Over 130 localities and states declared racism a public
health emergency, including the states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Nevada, and
the localities of Boston, Denver, Columbus, Cook County, Pittsburgh,
Minneapolis, Memphis, and Dallas, the vast majority doing so this past
summer.7 Many, therefore, continue to diagnose civil rights problems and their
solutions using medical frames. Are these policymakers, backed by activists,
wrong to do so? The answer, according to legal scholarship that has explicitly
considered the question, seems to be yes.8
My ambitions are, in some ways, modest. I simply argue that while the legal
scholarship has emphasized the harms of using medical discourse, it has not
explicitly considered its benefits across social movements—and there are
several. Rather than suggest that these activists have miscalculated, I seek to
understand why activists and policymakers have deployed medical frames.
Further, recognizing that medical discourse and the rights—and burdens—it
produces are malleable, I seek to explore ways in which to further its social
justice possibilities.
For some actors, however, the costs may still outweigh the benefits, and
my interlocutors perform a valuable task in elucidating their perspective. Those
calculations may change, not just from group to group, but from individual to
individual, and there is substantial disagreement within groups.9 Our
conversation is part of a broader one among various disciplines, including
medical humanities, disability theory, and health policy. While historically the
relationship between at least some of these disciplines, particularly medical
humanities and disability theory, was “tense and distant,”10 as this engagement
represents, the scholarship has moved in the direction of “bridge-building” and
“cross-pollinat[ion].”11
To further that end I focus on three main questions: What benefits does
medicalization provide, who is involved in offering and receiving the benefits,
and why do medical frames provide these benefits? But before I do any of that,
I address a fundamental question on which there is significant confusion—what
is “medicalization”?
6. ‘We Are Living in a Racism Pandemic,’ Says APA President, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N (May 29,

2020), https://perma.cc/NZB5-HEQF.

7. Declarations of Racism as a Public Health Issue, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N,

https://perma.cc/KK89-CQP7 (archived Dec. 3, 2020).

8. See Craig Konnoth, Medicalization and the New Civil Rights, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1165, 1202-

08 (2020).
9. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 78-83 (discussi ng diverse approaches to the
transgender movement and diagnoses).
10. Carol Thomas, Medical Sociology and Disability Theory, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF CHRONIC AND DISABLING CONDITIONS: ASSAULTS ON THE LIFEWORLD
44 (Graham Scambler & Sasha Scambler eds., 2010) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS].
11. Simon J. Williams, The Biopolitics of Chronic Illness: Biology, Power and Personhood, in
NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 10, at 205, 207; Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1171.
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I.

What is Medicalization?

One fundamental concern Belt and Dorfman raise goes to the concept of
medicalization. They argue, both at the beginning and at the end of their
response, that by supporting medicalization, I am advancing an “older model of
disability advocacy” that “perpetuate[s] dependency and charity,” that shifts
power from patients to experts, and that results in societal alienation.12 In
particular, they suggest that I am advancing the “medical aspects” of disability,
rather than the “social model.”13
The distinction they offer, presumably, tracks that of the “medical” and
“social” model of disability that the Article describes at length.14 Roughly
speaking, in cases of disability, the medical model requires changes and “cures”
to the bodily traits of the person experiencing disability, while the social model
suggests changes to social circumstances that render the trait disabling—thus,
instead of forcing a cochlear implant on an individual, as the medical model
requires, the social model requires accessible signing services.
In their treatment of the medical and social models, Belt and Dorfman do
not mention the Article’s discussion, so I cannot claim this for sure—but I
suspect our disagreement is terminological. By partially defending medical
discourse, I do not defend the medical model, as medical discourse and “medical
model” in disability theory are not the same thing. Disability theory uses the
phrase “medical model” to describe an archetype; it is a term of art that imagines
a solely biological approach to curing disability, thus emphasizing the harmful
possibilities of medicine.15 But the on-the-ground reality of modern medicine
has increasingly moved away from this sole reliance on biology, thanks in large
part to the work of disability activists. Indeed, as the Article explains, medical
frames today seek to advance structural solutions, such as housing and antiracism efforts.16 Medical discourse, today at least, deals heavily with the “social
environment”; the “medical model” does not.17 Conceptualizing medicine as
involving only a certain kind of medical professional exercising biological
authority imagines an ideal type of western medicine, embedded at a certain
point in history.18 The “medicalization” that Belt and Dorfman target is

12. Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 177-78, 184.
13. Id. at 187. See generally Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.

Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415 (2013) (describing the importance of
structural solutions to achieve anti-subordination).
Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1180 n.58.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 1197.
Indeed, many disability scholars today protest the biological-social dichotomy as not
reflecting lived experience, as the original Article notes, and I disavow that I am
making claims regarding biological situatedness, explicitly, either way. Id.
See Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1255 n.476.

106

Medical Civil Rights as a Site of Activism
73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 104 (2020)

therefore a faux ami—or perhaps, a faux enemi; it is not the purely biologically
based medical model that they rightly question.
In understanding how medicine came to look to (some) structural
solutions, it is important to understand that medicine is a social discourse,
shaped by time and place and by those who invoke it. For most of human
history—from the ancient Greeks to well into the nineteenth century—
medicine was generally understood as an art that sought to maintain the balance
of bodily “humors” or fluids.19 Both behavior, and (with Christianity’s arrival)
sin, determined how the humors were balanced, but with some groups—racial
minorities, women, the poor—the humors were always out of sync.20 This
meant that the fault for medical harm lay within the bodies or soul.
The twentieth century has generally abstracted medical fault away from the
body through a process that has invited controversy and turmoil. First, the
germ theory of the late nineteenth century meant that individuals were not
solely responsible for ill health—tuberculosis, for example, was proven not to
be the result of an imbalance in the humors, but rather the result of germs.
Eugenic arguments remained—germs there may be, but the weak constitutions
of certain individuals caused them to succumb; indeed, some eugenicists
opposed public health programs so that those weakly constituted would die.21
Mid-century approaches turned to technical, biological remedies, and the
focus was on professionals imposing cures on the patient.22 This is the period
which Belt and Dorfman highlight—they rely heavily on the work of pioneering
medical sociologist Talcott Parsons, who emphasized the stunted power
dynamics between doctor and patient.23 Subsequent sociologists and disability
scholars have criticized Parsons’s observations as representing an “ideal type,”
and an “abstract hypothetical construct” (much like the medical model),24 and
have argued that patients often occupied “active,” rather than “passive” roles
even then.25 In any case, Parson’s observations were made in 1951—twenty
19. See Craig Konnoth, Medical Stereotypes 10 (May 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on

file with author).

20. Id. at 11.

21. Martin S. Pernick, Eugenics and Public Health in American History, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH

1767, 1767 (1997).

22. See Nancy Krieger, Epidemiology and Social Sciences: Towards a Critical Reengagement in

the 21st Century, 22 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 155, 159 (2000) (“[T]he bulk of early- to mid20th century US epidemiologic inquiry either ignores social factors or treats them as
nuisance variables encountered en route to ascertaining the ‘true’ etiology (read
‘biological causes’) of disease”).
23. Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 183 & nn.40-44.
24. Kathy Charmaz, Studying the Experience of Chronic Illness through Grounded Theory, in
NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 10, at 8, 14; Carl May, Retheorizing the Clinical Encounter:
Normalization Processes and the Corporate Ecologies of Care, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra
note 10, at 129, 131.
25. Graham Scrambler & Sasha Scrambler, Introduction: The Sociology of Chronic and
Disabling Conditions, Assaults on the Lifeworld, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 10,
at 1, 2.
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years before the birth of the bioethics movement, and forty before mainstream
medical (re-)engagement with social determinants of health.
Starting in the 1970s, the bioethics movement began in earnest,
emphasizing the importance of informed consent and patient participation.26
Further, while technical remedies have remained important, at least since the
early 2000s, researchers have refocused their energies on so-called social
determinants of health, which continued some threads of public health work
from nearly a century before.27 On this account, both material- and statusbased factors in one’s environment such as housing, employment, financial,
family, social, and educational circumstances, all affect health.28 It has only been
in the last two decades or so, however, that efforts have begun in earnest to
address these social determinants,29 and some—such as racism, as the Article
describes—are still being understood.30
As a procedural matter, bioethics has thus begun the task of seeking
participatory justice. As a substantive matter, social determinants emphasize
substantive goals involving equity. That bifurcated understanding can frame
several movements that, in turn, affected the social role of medicine.
In the 1970s, for example, psychiatrists who became embedded in Vietnam
veteran organizations “as peers”—that is, as fellow activists, rather than as
distanced professionals—successfully pushed for Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) to be recognized as an after-effect of combat.31 As the
Veterans Administration notes today, this meant that “the significant change
ushered in by the PTSD concept was the stipulation that the etiological agent
was outside the individual (i.e., a traumatic event) rather than an inherent
individual weakness.”32 Participatory justice thus achieved substantive justice—
the profession realized that society, rather than the individual, was responsible
for trauma.
As medical sociologists describe, other movements—such as the breast
cancer movement—built on these techniques seeking to emphasize social
structures in medical narratives.33 The Article goes on to describe in detail how
26. See Olubukunola Mary Tawose, The Legal Boundaries of Informed Consent, 10 AM. MED.

ASS’N J. ETHICS 521, 522 (2008).

27. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1196.

28. Jeff Niederdeppe, Q. Lisa Bu, Porismita Borah, David A. Kindig & Stephanie A.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Robert, Message Design Strategies to Raise Public Awareness of Social Determinants of Health
and Population Health Disparities, 86 MILBANK Q. 481, 482-83 (2008).
Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1196.
Id. at Part IV.B.2.
Konnoth, supra note 19, at nn.423-29 and accompanying text.
Matthew J. Friedman, PTSD History and Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS.,
https://perma.cc/7FUW-AU52 (archived Dec. 3, 2020).
MAREN KLAWITER, THE BIOPOLITICS OF BREAST CANCER: CHANGING CULTURES OF
DISEASE AND ACTIVISM, 165-168 (2008) (discussing how the women’s breast cancer
movement built directly on the AIDS movement).
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today, lay individuals participate in medical narratives and knowledge making
more than ever before. I discuss how medical social movements have shaped
diagnoses, how “[p]atients and former patients . . . ‘sit on state mental health
councils, work for mental health agencies, and serve on treatment policy
committees,’” and engage with Institutional Review and governance boards of
medical institutions.34 I explain how outside medical institutions, lay
individuals shape medical discourse through numerous means, far beyond the
reach of the medical profession.
As a result, interventions are evolving. Insurance—from Medicaid to
insurers like Aetna—seek to promote social and structural remedies like
housing, to some degree at least.35 Provider groups are hiring social workers to
connect patients to remedies that would historically be considered nonmedical.36 These changes are desirable. Disability scholar Sam Bagenstos
discusses some of these changes in explaining how disability activists on the
ground rely on “the assistance and endorsement of professionals.”37 He sees the
incorporation of non-medical professions as de-medicalization—but I see it
rather as the influence of the disability movement on medicine, precisely what
disability theorists have called for.38
This discussion in the Article shows that medical discourse, in practice,
increasingly reflects Belt and Dorfman’s understanding of disability as
“formulated through a complex interaction between the impairment and the
social environment.”39 Many of these achievements derive from the efforts of
lay actors. Belt and Dorfman are concerned that the Article seeks to “tak[e] the
expertise and decisionmaking capacity away from patients and disabled
individuals and hand[] it over to other experts to make decisions for them.”40
But my Article applauds, at length,41 the “‘resistance and self-defense against’
coercive medical institutions” within medical discourse and the development of
“patient ‘counter-expertise’” both inside institutions and in society more
34. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1253 (quoting Nancy Tomes, From Outsiders to Insiders: The

35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Consumer-Survivor Movement and Its Impact on U.S. Mental Health Policy 113, in PATIENTS
AS POLICY ACTORS (Beatrix Hoffman, Nancy Tomes, Rachel Grob & Mark Schlesinger
eds., 2011)).
AMANDA CASSIDY, HEALTH AFFS., MEDICAID AND PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING 2
(Oct. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/5BEM-JE3Z; AETNA, PROMOTING HEALTH EQUITY
FOR LOW-WAGE WORKERS: HOW EMPLOYERS CAN REDUCE HEALTH CARE COSTS,
INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY AND HELP EMPLOYEES STAY HEALTHY 4 (2019),
https://perma.cc/QBG4-B5U5.
See Lindsey Getz, Accountable Care Organizations: Social Work’s Impact on an Emerging
Model, SOCIAL WORK TODAY, Mar. 2015, at 24.
SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 22 (2009).
Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1257 n.494.
Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 187.
Id. at 184.
Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1250-57.
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generally, that we are seeing today.42 While new understandings of and
engagement with medical discourse are layered upon older constructs instead
of fully displacing them, I do not, as my interlocutors worry, seek to advance
these “older models.”43 Rather, I find hope in new, social, participatory models
of medicine.
II. What Benefits Does Medicalization Provide?

What then, are the benefits that this new world of medicalization brings?
Hoffman and Belt and Dorfman suggest that the benefits are limited. Hoffman
suggests that medical civil rights remedies are not structural: they take an
“individualized patient-centric” approach and focus on changing behavior
instead of background conditions.44 Belt and Dorfman similarly argue that the
benefits do not involve “broad-scale social reform.”45
The issue is one of perspective, and of comparativity. First, as a matter of
perspective, what is structural change depends on the kinds of structure at issue.
In some cases, all that happens is that an individual gets a “small-bore item[]
like [an] ergonomic chair[].”46 Sometimes, an office may get a ramp that
benefits those with mobility issues, or, for that matter, those pushing a baby
carriage or hauling a heavy suitcase.47 One level up, there might be change to
the practices of an entire school district. A level above that, the practices across
a global company might change.48 But there are also widespread programmatic
changes: those that provide housing and employment assistance under
Medicaid, to take one example.49 And indeed, the passage of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) itself, along with other statutes that ensure that
42. Id. at 1250 (quoting Robert A. Nye, The Evolution of the Concept of Medicalization in the
43.

44.
45.
46.
47.

48.

49.

Late Twentieth Century, 39 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCIS. 115, 124 (2003)). Indeed, the relevant
Subpart is entitled “Inside medical institutions: Patient empowerment.” Id.
Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 188. I recognize this potential nominal and
terminological confusion when citing a source on which Belt and Dorfman
subsequently rely. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1250 n.451; Belt & Dorfman, supra note
1, at 183-84 nn.45-46 (both citing Maayan Sudai, Revisiting the Limits of Professional
Autonomy: The Intersex Rights Movement’s Path to De-Medicalization, 41 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 1 (2018)).
Hoffman, supra note 1, at 166, 168.
Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 182.
Id.
See Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 841, 846
(2008); Jamie Gold, The ADA on Its 30th Anniversary: Looking Back and Forward, FORBES
(July 26, 2020, 8:00 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/3E3K-JBT8.
See, e.g., Alex Thornton, ‘We Are at a Crossroads’–How Microsoft’s Accessibility Team is
Making an Impact that Will Be Felt for Generations, MICROSOFT (Sept. 25, 2019),
https://perma.cc/B2LR-ZH83 (providing overview of Microsoft’s accessibility
initiatives).
Mary Crossley, Bundling Justice: Medicaid’s Support for Housing, 46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
595, 595 (2018) (discussing housing as a medical necessity).
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numerous individuals across the country can have access to “small-bore”
benefits, constitutes a vast structural change. Such change, I would posit, is far
from “granular.”50
Next, Belt and Dorfman claim that the “apparent generosity” of disability
law is “belied” by the reality51—a fact that is, alas, true of civil rights law in
general. Further, disability—and, more generally, medicalization—designations
come with costs, such as stigmatization, that the original Article documents
exhaustively. Here, the comparativity point comes into play: How do the
medicalization benefits compare to those of previous years—that is, what trend
is medicalization on—and how do medical rights compare to other kinds of
rights?
There is no question that the benefits medicalization provides have
improved drastically over a relatively short period of time. Social determinants
of health literature entered the mainstream, on some accounts, in the 1990s.52
Hoffman alludes to Thomas Frieden’s famous public health pyramid in
describing public health measures that envisage behavioral change among
individuals.53 While Hoffman raises concerns that ongoing measures do not
address the bottom of the pyramid, which refers to the social environment in
which individuals live, public health measures are indeed moving in that
direction. Researchers of public health recognize, as Hoffman notes, that
unhealthy eating is not just about lack of access to food stores—“[i]t is more
about who has the time and money to exercise and cook,” and “habits developed
over generations of poverty.”54 And that is why medical programs have recently
intervened more and more in seeking to support financial, housing, and
employment assistance, and even cooking classes.55 Similarly, in the context of
long-term care support, it is clear both that “the notion that social insurance
should support the medical but not the social aspects of care endures in a deep
way,” but at the same time, that “Medicaid’s institutional bias has receded in
favor of home-based care.”56 Things are changing.
But what about the changes in other areas of law? Changes there seem less
promising, and in the original Article, I go through a litany of other
possibilities, from laws prohibiting race and sex discrimination to those
offering unemployment and housing benefits, which seem to have receded,
50. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 169.

51. Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 181.
52. ALEC IRWIN & ELENA SCALI, WORLD HEALTH ORG., ACTION ON THE SOCIAL
53.
54.
55.

56.

DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH: LEARNING FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES 23 (2005),
https://perma.cc/L39C-EEUF.
Hoffman, supra note 1, at 167.
Id. at 168.
See, e.g., Keith Brannon, Tulane University School of Medicine to Open First-of-Its-Kind
Teaching Kitchen, TUL. U. (May 9, 2013, 11:00 AM), https://perma.cc/5QUM-L5KK;
Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1197.
Hoffman, supra note 1, at 172.
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even as medical frames have advanced more and more rights.57 My claims there
remain largely unchallenged.58 Hoffman herself notes that civil rights law in
general suffers from many of the same pathologies that she attributes to medical
civil rights: Civil rights law “relies increasingly on individual legal claims and
harms, and structural interventions have become increasingly difficult.”59 Belt
and Dorfman point to an “updated and nuanced” social conception of rights, but
do not offer a concrete vehicle through which they can manifest.60
Medicalization, on my account, is just that vehicle.
That said, it is true that medicine can “sit on both sides of the law in a
problematic way”61—it can justify liberty deprivations as well as liberty
recognition. My point, however, is that the pendulum has shifted over the last
century from the former to the latter. And now, as law by itself—which also can
both oppress and liberate—is proving to be a less fecund source for rights, we
must ensure that the battle within and outside medicine continues to maintain
its trend.
Last, Hoffman suggests that in the long run, medicalization might address
only the “physical manifestations” of discrimination.62 I agree that should there
be a retrenchment in medical rights such that only physical harms are
cognizable, it would indeed be problematic. But thanks to concerted efforts,
medical civil rights have not been limited in that way. To take one example,
when the ADA was proposed, Jesse Helms and his allies opposed classifying
mental impairments as disabilities under the Act.63 That attempt was beaten
back.64 Thus, both the ADA and Social Security programs, among others, cover

57. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1168-69, 1213-31; see also id. at 1245 (noting how positive

rights claims in non-medical contexts are stigmatizing).

58. Belt and Dorfman disagree with my claim that the welfare-based predecessors of

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Medicaid treated their claimants worse than Social Security because it was only the
intent of the Social Security programs to do so, and the actuality is different. Belt &
Dorfman, supra note 1, at 181 n.29. My Article, however, makes this point. See
Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1207 (noting “despite these intentions, rather than
dignifying individuals, these rights can impose various kinds of stigma” and detailing
stigmatic narratives). Second, in refuting my comparative point, none of their sources
actually compares Medicaid or its predecessors to Social Security (when Medicaid is
mentioned at all). Cf. Telephone Interview with Claire Dickson, Supervising Att’y,
Colo. Legal Aid (Aug. 13, 2020) (noting that on the whole, Medicaid involves more
intrusion than Social Security, but that it depends on the program at issue). Third,
they raise concerns about the age of the source I rely on, but it remains the foremost
comparative account of Medicaid and Social Security.
Hoffman, supra note 1, at 166.
Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 187.
Hoffman, supra note 1, at 170.
Id. at 165.
Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be
Undone?, 8 J. L. & HEALTH 15, 27 (1993).
Id. at 27-28.
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both “physical or mental” conditions.65 And plaintiffs have obtained concrete
benefits from claiming that gender identity disorder is a “legitimate mental
disorder.”66 More recently, in P.P. v. Compton Unified School District,
litigators focused on the psychological trauma caused by racism, poverty, and
homelessness.67 To be sure, litigators “detail[ed] the body’s response to trauma”
including “neurobiological effects” that “affect[] the brain,” but the factual
allegations based on which the court ruled focus on how psychological harms
affect behavior.68 The allegation of physical harm, in other words, is
inseparable from, and arguably flows from many kinds of mental impairments.
III. Who Is Involved?

In the first Part, I describe in detail how medical knowledge and framing is
no longer the province of medical professionals alone. Sociologists like Nikolas
Rose and Steven Epstein describe at length how lay individuals use medical
frames as part of their self-understanding—as my Article describes at length,
these new forms of engagement ground “biosocial organization” through
phenomena such as the proliferation of medical devices, home medical care,
and the engagement of other professions in care, as understanding of social
determinants abounds.69 This means that groups often understand themselves
in medical terms, and engage in medical activism—including movements that
pressed for diagnoses including PTSD, Battered Women’s Syndrome, coal
miners’ lung, and the like.70
Similarly, today, so-called COVID-19 “long-haulers”—individuals with
persistent COVID-19 symptoms have “set up their own support groups,” and
are “running their own research projects, [and] form[ing] alliances with people
who have similar illnesses, such as . . . chronic fatigue syndrome. A British
group—LongCovidSOS—launched a campaign to push the government for
recognition, research, and support.”71 This has led to policy support for
increased funding for research into the way we measure long-term COVID-19
outcomes.72
Hoffman, however, suggests that non-medical rights claims can more
directly relate to group identity. Cases that do not (explicitly) include medical
discourse, like Obergefell v. Hodges, “can . . . quickly translate into group-level
65. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1182.

66. Id. at 1191 (quoting O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 59 (2010)).
67. 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
68. Id. at 1103, 1105.

69. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1255, 1257.

70. Konnoth, supra note 19, at 8, 31, 48, 61.

71. Ed Yong, Long-Haulers Are Redefining COVID-19, ATLANTIC (Aug. 19, 2020),

https://perma.cc/J8DU-RHCJ.

72. Id.
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benefits and social understandings.”73 Those cases directly target the basis of
discrimination—homophobia, racism, and sexism—rather than hiding behind
the “scrim” of medicine.74
But part of my claim is that rather than making medical claims
disingenuously or in ways that are delinked from their realities, the “social
understandings” of groups about their identities and the discrimination they
experience are increasingly intertwined with medical narratives. We saw this
dynamic in Obergefell, where Justice Kennedy relied on medical evidence to
claim that homosexuality is immutable.75 Similarly, our understanding of race
is infused with medical understandings: Scholars such as Ruqaiijah Yearby,
Lindsay Wiley, and myself have argued that medical discourse has the power to
perpetuate or to help alleviate racism, especially when racism is understood as
a phenomenon where social determinants of health are denied.76
Discriminatory phenomena thus have their roots in various narratives of
power—medicine is often one of them, and advocates may choose to emphasize
its relationship to their experience.
The trans rights movement offers perhaps the most compelling example of
this phenomenon. As Belt and Dorfman note, the ICD-11, which guides the
diagnoses of all medical professionals, removed gender dysphoria with the
support of many trans rights organizations.77 But what they leave unsaid is that
transgender activists see both harms and benefits to complete demedicalization,78 and the ICD replaces the term with “gender incongruence” in
a separate section of the DSM, to maintain access to health services and the
like.79 Thus, while the claim that trans activists seek to de-pathologize trans
identity is fair, the suggestion that the ICD “de-medicalizes trans identities” or
73. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 166. But see Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1200 (noting how
74.
75.
76.

77.
78.
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Determinants of Health Framework to Include the Root Cause, 48 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 518,
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Scope of Public Health Law, PETRIE-FLOM CTR.: BILL OF HEALTH (Sep. 29, 2020),
https://perma.cc/ST8W-THHK; Konnoth, supra note 19, at Part IV.B.2.
Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 184-85.
See generally GLOBAL ACTION FOR TRANS EQUALITY, IT’S TIME FOR REFORM: TRANS*
HEALTH ISSUES IN THE INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS OF DISEASES, (2011),
https://perma.cc/B85Z-U93Z (discussing the costs and benefits of demedicalization).
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that that move is “supported by [all?] trans rights organizations,”80 disregards
diverse approaches in the trans movement, many of which intertwine medicine
in their narratives of identity. This allows transgender advocates to seamlessly
include medical civil rights claims in their litigation strategy. For example, as
counsel of record on an amicus brief in support of the transgender plaintiff in
Bostock v. Clayton County, in which the Court held in June that Title VII
prohibited anti-transgender discrimination, I engaged in deep conversations
with lawyers from my days as an LGBT rights activist about ensuring that either
in victory or defeat, the viability of ADA-based arguments would not be
affected.81 As trans rights lawyers would point out, those arguments are still
important for ongoing cases.82
Notably, the dynamic here is precisely that which describes medical civil
rights in general. Medical discourse remains important precisely for access to
rights and benefits, and members of the relevant group support its engagement.
At the same time, because of the involvement of members of these groups,
medical discourse is being used descriptively, without pathologizing. The result
is the use of medical discourse, but at the same time, in a way that seeks to
“depathologise and destigmatise the individuals called ‘transgender.’”83 Medical
categories—pregnancy, genetic susceptibility to certain conditions, or
categories of individuals at risk for flu—do not pathologize the groups to which
they refer. Through activism, and broadening consciousness, the goal is to
extend that approach to other categories.84
While groups might invoke medical discourse, it is not the case—as Belt
and Dorfman claim—that I “want[] more people to use medical claiming.”85 To
the contrary, my Article suggests that, as the explosion in medical civil rights
claims shows, counter to the consensus in the legal literature, the benefits of
medical civil rights seeking may outweigh the cost: “[L]ike any litigant, a
medical civil rights claimant must consider whether, in their particular
80. Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 185.
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circumstance, benefits outweigh costs.”86 At the same time, “[t]here is no
formulaic answer for when this will be the case . . . . The analysis might hinge
on the legal frame at issue, the condition involved, or personal preference” and,
as the example of transgender rights shows, individuals in the same group will
take different tacks.87 Our task going forward, however, is to limit the costs.
Interestingly, even as Hoffman points to the many advantages of groupbased claims, Belt and Dorfman point to the gatekeeping concerns group claims
create,88 which plague traditional civil rights groups as well as those who claim
medicalization discourse.89 Scholars like Bagenstos thus also support universal
approaches to addressing harm, such as universal healthcare, that remove the
focus on people with disabilities (and medicalized populations, as well) as
uniquely needy.90 Indeed, some disability theorists, I note, argue for
emphasizing that we are all on a “continuous spectrum”—there is no clear line
between disability and non-disability.91 In the Article, I emphasize that the
normalcy of medical discourse, as all individuals increasingly understand
themselves through paradigms mediated by medical devices, genetic profiles,
and “risk” analyses, can also create a form of “interest convergence.”92 Yes,
specific groups will continue to agitate for medical rights. But as legal scholar
Martha Albertson Fineman and medical sociologist Simon Williams have
argued, our material frailty demonstrates our common “vulnerability,”
“dependence,”93 and indeed, our humanity.
IV. Why Do Medical Civil Rights Provide Benefits?

In the Article, I explain that health policy today often provides medical civil
rights. My key point—which my respondents do not deny—is that most appear
to agree that shifting risk for a particular condition upon individuals expresses
that, at a society-wide level, we assign blame to them for that condition. When
we relieve risk from them, we are expressing that they should not be blamed
for that harm. And as I document in detail, American history for the last seventy
years has—not without the conflict that all social change attracts—involved
dramatic reduction in medical risk with the passage of social security, the ADA,
86. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1248.
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and the Affordable Care Act.94 While society has shifted risk for other
misfortunes—poverty, unemployment, and the like—back onto individuals,
similar attempts in the medical context have failed.95 And when tasks are
framed as medical, assistance is forthcoming. To take one example from
Hoffman’s response, as long as long-term care by family members was seen as
“custodial,” Medicaid did not pay for it; as it began to be framed as medical,
Medicaid stepped up.96
I do not deny that scattered exceptions exist—even while these programs
offered protections for certain conditions, they left certain groups, such as those
addicted to drugs, smokers, kleptomaniacs, and the like, out of their
protections.97 But—and I emphasize again—these were exceptions. My
interlocutors do not deny that the broad rule over the last seventy years has
been to move risk away from patients. Rather, they seek to add three additional
exceptions to the list. Even if correct, these exceptions do not disprove the rule,
but I have concerns even over these claimed exceptions.
The first example involves the opioid crisis. I follow a swathe of scholars in
arguing that the medicalization of the opioid epidemic has resulted in a far more
lenient approach to opioid addicts than to crack addicts who were
criminalized.98 Hoffman, who questions this conclusion, presents no
comparative data to counter this comparative claim.99 But she raises two fair
alternatives to the medicalization explanation for why we blame opioid addicts
less: (a) we blame doctors more because they were more to blame, and (b) they
are more likely to be white than crack addicts.100
On the first possibility, the fact that we appropriately blame doctors has no
clear bearing on the blame opioid addicts should carry. As Khiara Bridges notes,
just as opioid addicts were subject to social forces (such as unscrupulous
doctors) that led to addiction, so too were crack addicts.101 Yet we are more
likely to blame those social forces in cases involving opioid addiction.
Second, Hoffman is quite right that the blame game in these respective
addiction epidemics has a lot to do with race. But, as I explain in a working
draft, race has a lot to do with medicalization.102 It is harder for Black people to
medicalize problems in ways that seek rights—a problem I engage with in this
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95. Id. at 1228.
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separate work—and the issue has to do with the fact that “[t]here is
discrimination in the way rights are distributed—not just medical rights.”103
And the issue of race is deeply intertwined with the issue of medicalization.
Finally, and most importantly, Hoffman does not engage with the
statements of policymakers I quote that specifically invoke the medicalization
frame to justify different treatment of opioid and crack addicts.104 The ultimate
animating factor may be racism, but medicine has the rhetorical and
legitimizing power to produce the racist outcomes that benefit whites and harm
Black people.
Hoffman next argues that the case of undocumented immigrants also shows
our lack of empathy for harms framed as medical: “medical need could limit
someone’s ability to come to the United States legally under public charge
rules.”105 Further, the Trump administration has not released immigrants in
detention camps under the COVID threat.106 Yet both her points in fact
demonstrate the power of medicalization. The public charge rules are an
acknowledgement that we do, as a society, take solicitude of individuals—once
in this country—when they suffer medical misfortune. Medicalization is not a
miracle frame—it will not persuade an administration like the current one to do
justice on all fronts. And yet, on some fronts, it has been surprisingly effective.
Finally, Belt and Dorfman describe a series of cases at length that showed a
Court unsympathetic to the ADA, demanding that people, for example,
“mitigate[]” disabilities.107 I describe these cases only in a footnote108—because
in 2008, President George W. Bush (in his second term) signed a law, passed by
unanimous consent in the Senate, overturning these cases.109 That saga appears
to reinforce my claims regarding the power of medicalization in the halls of
policy. And while many Americans evince hostility to people living with
disabilities—as a comparative matter, and given the policy changes I describe,
attitudes towards medical misfortune in general remain unclear, contextual,
and complex. When we speak as a society, however, our message is usually
quite clear.
Conclusion

There remains a lot to do. As Belt and Dorfman note, many medical civil
rights remedies exact harm, and are not as effective as they could be. Medical
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rights, as the Article admits, are “Janus-faced.”110 And Hoffman quotes my
claim that “[m]edical claims are malleable [and] contingent . . . social
phenomena” with concern—medical civil rights can be changed for the
worse.111
And yet individuals seek these rights in growing numbers. Indeed, while
the Trump years have exacted damage across all forms of rights-seeking, the
longer trend and “broader perspective” of medical rights-seeking has been
promising.112 The task then, is not to tell individuals, activists, and groups that
they are wrong, but to seek how to use these rights’ malleability to co-opt,
shape, and transform medical civil rights to limit their harms and maximize
their promise. The efforts of scholars and activists—among which the
scholarship and work of my respondents are among the foremost—have helped
move the needle in that direction. And we must continue onward. My
respondents are correct that my Article is a (limited) defense of the
phenomenon of medical civil rights. But it is more than that. It is also a call to
arms.
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